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introduction
Depose the taliBan. restore freedom and democracy. protect Women’s rights and human rights. The United States has always presented its military intervention in 
Afghanistan in these simple terms. After the quick ousting of 
the Taliban, the signing of the Bonn Agreement brought hope 
for pluralistic government and human dignity. Seven years into 
Operation Enduring Freedom, however, promises made by the 
United States and the international community to the people of 
Afghanistan remain largely unfulfilled.
The demands of the Afghan people were not very high; they 
included basic notions of human security and freedom to exer-
cise basic human rights. Several strategic mistakes have under-
cut the achievement of these goals. U.S.-led forces succeeded in 
removing the Taliban but failed to eradicate it before diverting 
attention to Iraq. Relying on warlords who have no commitment 
to democracy to maintain order, U.S. policy over-emphasized 
military power at the expense of nation and state building, eco-
nomic growth, and social development.
On March 26, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama unveiled 
his foreign policy plan in Afghanistan. The plan, which centers 
around a troop surge, includes military and civil society training, 
making deals with certain groups of insurgents, and financial aid 
to Pakistan. In its implementation, the plan must not only deal 
with the effects of the security vacuum but take a more holistic 
approach in addressing the causes of the lack of security. A troop 
surge would provide short term security gains but will result in 
little enduring change unless complemented with a “develop-
ment surge.” The United States must reframe its security goals 
to encompass the overall human security threat of poverty, and 
any political solution must promote basic human rights and 
equality.
HiStoricaL Background
Since 1978, three distinct phases have marked the conflicts 
in Afghanistan, and U.S. policy mistakes during each phase con-
tinue to haunt Afghanistan. The first phase started in 1978 with a 
bloody, top-down revolution, and continued through the occupa-
tion by the Soviet Union in December 1979. The Soviet occupa-
tion resulted in a decade and a half of forced disappearances, 
displacement of civilians, mass killings, and political oppression 
by the ruling pro-Soviet forces. When the United States and 
other western forces chose to support the Afghans’ fight against 
the Soviet invasion, they chose the most backward and conser-
vative groups as proxy fighters against the communist regime. 
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Subsequently, these groups became increasingly uncontrollable 
and transformed into the biggest problem of Afghan society.
The 1992 collapse of the Soviet-backed regime of Dr. 
Mohammad Najibullah prompted the second phase. The United 
States and western countries lost interest in Afghanistan after the 
end of the cold war. Most of the military factions who fought 
the Soviet troops and the pro-Soviet government consolidated 
their hold on power and began fighting amongst each other. The 
warring factions used ethnicity as a divisive weapon and sparked 
another round of serious human rights violations. Ignoring such 
human rights abuses was the second phase’s strategic mistake.
The third phase began in 1994 with the emergence of the 
Taliban in Kandahar. The Afghan people were weary of perva-
sive lawlessness and of the intense fighting among Mujahideen 
groups; the Taliban attracted civilians with the promise of 
security provided by confiscating weapons from the various 
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of most parts of Afghanistan, they became more violent and 
more restrictive of people’s basic freedoms. Although every 
Afghan citizen suffered under the Taliban regime, its primary 
victims were women and ethnic and religious minorities. During 
the Taliban regime, the West’s apathy completely isolated 
Afghanistan, turning it into a safe haven for terrorists and into 
the world’s biggest opium producer. Although the proxy war in 
Afghanistan was won against the communists, it degenerated 
into a bloody civil war. Not until after the attacks on the United 
States of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) did the world focus again 
on the situation in Afghanistan and realize that it had become 
al-Qaeda’s playground.
improving Security
Currently, Afghan civilians are sandwiched between inter-
national forces and the Taliban. The high numbers of civilian 
casualties produced by international action makes it difficult for 
Afghans to recognize the friendly purposes of the international 
forces; the Taliban and other insurgent groups use this confu-
sion as leverage to manipulate civilians. In conducting military 
operations, therefore, both international forces and the Afghan 
government must adhere to international humanitarian and 
human rights laws and minimize civilian casualties. The troops 
must show the Afghan people that the international forces will 
protect and restore safety and security.
The security strategy needs to become more organized and 
comprehensive. Differences of strategy among the international 
community tend to impact the country negatively. The various 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams should coordinate with each 
other and learn from each others’ successes and failures. 
Additionally, the international community should avoid viewing 
security in Afghanistan as an isolated problem. A regional solu-
tion is required, especially one that includes neighboring coun-
tries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. President Obama’s plan 
is encouraging because it emphasizes cooperation with Pakistan, 
but progress in Pakistan requires resolution of the conflict in the 
Kashmir region between Pakistan and India. The continuation of 
ethnic and religious conflict in Kashmir provides a focus around 
which Islamic extremists can rally and radicalism can grow. The 
United States and the international community should engage 
Afghanistan’s neighbors with a united approach.
It is cheaper and more sustainable to train and fund Afghan 
security forces than to have a continued NATO presence, and 
President Obama has pledged additional resources to do so. 
Maximizing the effectiveness of those resources requires learn-
ing from past mistakes and examining the shortcomings of the 
current domestic security apparatus. Traditionally, local police 
are underequipped, ill-resourced, and underpaid. Remedying 
these shortcomings should be the cornerstone for establishing 
a committed and professional Afghan National Police Force 
(“ANP”). Mechanisms should be implemented to closely monitor 
the ANP and the Afghan National Army (“ANA”) to hold them 
accountable for their actions. Quick fixes should be avoided, and 
structural support ought not be directed towards tribal militia 
or Afghan National Auxiliary police. Similarly, the creation of 
an Iraqi-style militia should be avoided because recent history 
has shown that militias do not protect the state. Militia mem-
ber loyalties lie, not with the constitution of Afghanistan, but 
with the militia commanders who supply income and employ-
ment. Creating tribal militias also sparks more ethnic tension 
and undermines important peace-building initiatives such as 
the Disarmament, Demilitarization, and Reintegration process 
(“DDR”) and the Disband Illegally Armed Groups program 
(“DIAG”); both programs transform former soldiers in post-
conflict regions into civilians.
Achieving lasting peace requires a political solution, but 
political solutions should not be limited solely to negotiation 
with Taliban and opposition groups. Working with opposition 
groups should not overshadow efforts to enhance the capacity 
and capability of the existing institutions that are based on good 
governance, rule of law, and human rights. Any political nego-
tiation with anti-government elements should not compromise 
accountability, justice, and human rights principles, and the 
victims of human rights violations should not be victimized for 
political gains again and again.
figHting poverty
Merely addressing the obvious signs of the lack of security 
are insufficient to effectuate enduring change. A “development 
surge” must complement the troop surge, and the concept of 
security must incorporate overall “human security” and address 
the issue of poverty. Fighting poverty requires the rebuilding of 
Afghanistan’s physical and social institutions. Such reconstruc-
tion efforts require an increase in development aid and its wise 
allocation.
A comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy for the reduc-
tion of poverty will reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to 
recruit young Afghans and Muslims. We cannot reduce poverty 
without investing in education, the primary tool for changing the 
mentality of a society. One of the reasons the war in Afghanistan 
has been so long and violent is the population’s lack of educa-
tion. All levels of education need support, including scholarships 
for higher education. Greater access to education is especially 
important for young girls. Education builds the nation’s human 
capacity for reconstructing Afghanistan’s institutions. Health 
care must be another focus of the multi-dimensional strategy. 
Without access to health care, especially reproductive care and 
birth control, poverty reduction is not possible.
The Afghan government needs to increase its own capacity to 
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its commitment to carry out the reforms necessary for uphold-
ing good governance, rule of law, human rights, and justice. The 
government should concentrate on creating job opportunities 
for youths and ensuring fair distribution of development proj-
ects. Over the past seven years, most development money was 
allocated toward the southern provinces where the majority of 
violence and drug production occurred; very little was distrib-
uted toward more secure regions that do not produce opium. The 
government needs to shift to allocation policies that reward good 
behavior and build the capacity of stable regions that shelter per-
sons displaced by ongoing war and conflict in other regions.
BuiLding Legitimacy and good governance
Establishing a credible, functioning, and responsive govern-
ment did not receive enough attention over the last seven years. 
The Afghan government needs strong political will—and United 
States support—to fight corruption and promote accountability 
and justice. Free and fair elections and protecting the rights of 
women and minority groups are necessary elements to achieving 
legitimacy in government.
Promoting democracy through the mechanism of free and 
fair elections is essential to solving the problems of countries in 
conflict like Afghanistan. The only way to guarantee the sustain-
ability of state institutions is to build the necessary confidence 
in our political system. The people of Afghanistan must buy into 
the ideas of democracy and power sharing in order for them to 
support and protect their elected government. As the August 
2009 presidential and 2010 parliamentary elections approach, 
every possible effort should be made to ensure they are transpar-
ent, free, fair, and on time.
The election protection effort must incorporate security and 
transparency at every stage of the process. Enhanced security is 
necessary to create an environment that enables participation in 
the political process by all Afghans. Fraud and nepotism must be 
rooted out of the entire process, from voter registration to elec-
tion day. Election officials should not allow culture and religion 
to undermine the integrity of the voting process. In some areas, 
residents claimed they did not want photographs taken of their 
women, and election officials allowed male members of the fam-
ily to register lists of female names. Those male family members 
then voted on behalf of the female family members. This both 
prevented women from exercising their human rights as citizens 
and created an opportunity for mass voter fraud, as officials 
never confirmed the existence of the registered names. Elections 
alone do not guarantee democracy anywhere, especially if they 
are not genuine and free.
I believe that increasing the people’s support for the gov-
ernment will minimize the power of anti-government groups. 
Political solutions should not marginalize the rights of the 
people for the expedience of integrating abusive power-holders. 
Nor should human rights principles be sidelined. As the Afghan 
government becomes a more assertive advocate of human rights 
and good governance, it will increase the likelihood of ending 
the culture of impunity and of replacing the law of force with 
the force of law.
Sustaining and promoting human rights is necessary for 
achieving peace, stability, development, and security. The 
protection and promotion of human rights, women’s rights, 
and gender equality is an unconditional state responsibility. 
Unfortunately, neither the Afghan government nor the interna-
tional community took the rights-based approach seriously in 
the past seven years.
Any public policy that truly intends to achieve peace in 
Afghanistan should have human rights and women’s rights at 
its center. An important ingredient of peace is justice. Without 
justice, the peace-building process will be incomplete and 
unsustainable. The government should cut ties with well-known 
human rights violators and warlords. The culture of impunity 
must end immediately, and everyone should be held accountable 
for their actions. The reform of the judiciary system can help 
build confidence among the Afghan people in the capabilities of 
the government and international community. The Afghan and 
U.S. governments need a more comprehensive strategy for pro-
moting human rights, especially women’s rights, in Afghanistan. 
Tradition, culture, and religion are no excuse for failing to pro-
mote women’s rights and women’s political participation in the 
country.
concLuSion
President Obama pledged additional troops and resources in 
order to foster security and development in Afghanistan. Security 
cannot be reached without development, however, and develop-
ment cannot be sustained without security. Neither security nor 
development is possible without respect for human rights and 
the full participation of women. U.S. policy in Afghanistan must 
endorse these rights-based values and not allow deference to tra-
ditional culture and religion to excuse failures to protect human 
rights and women’s rights.   HRB
Merely addressing the obvious signs of the lack  
of security are insufficient to effectuate enduring change. 
A “development surge” must complement the troop surge, 
and the concept of security must incorporate overall 
“human security” and address the issue of poverty.
